Productivity differences
between Northern and Southern Europe caused the eurocrisis
Between 1999 and today, a cost and productivity gap of
20-25% (more as concerns Greece) gradually arose.
Northern Europeans are more disciplined and controlled
than Latins. This in the past caused their currencies to steadily appreciate versus
their Southern neighbours.
Flexible exchange rates realign competitivity and avoid
permanent trade unbalances. This is not anymore case following the introduction
of the euro.
From 2004 onwards, Northern European countries
generated yearly trade surpluses of € 150-200 bln, in aggregate exceeding €
1,500 bln. “Latin” countries trade deficits where similar in size, as the total
euro area trade versus the rest of the world was approximately balanced.
This caused surplus (deficit) countries to accumulate
financial credits (debts).
As unbalances pile up, debtors solvency becomes more
and more doubtful.
This implies Southern European countries indebtedness
(governmental and / or private) to be too high, taking into account their
production level and their growth potential, to make financial markets
comfortable as concerns their ability to reimburse and / or refinance it.
Austerity alone is
self-defeating
Actions taken to cope with the crisis are based on two
main pillars.
Several European countries need to reduce their debt,
in particular public debt. This requires cutting government expenditure and
raising taxes.
Those countries must also become more competitive by
restructuring, improving productivity and cutting costs.
It basically is an “internal devaluation” strategy.
Problems: (1) the productivity gap took thirteen year to develop
and cannot be significantly reduced in a much shorter timeframe. Wages, and labor
costs in general, cannot be reduced so quickly as contracts take time to expire
and be renegotiated. In addition, several segments of the labor force enjoy
legal or political protections.
(2) As long as costs are reduced, income, consumption,
and asset values (ie real estate) decrease as well. This spells troubles for the banking system. Banks are
restricted in providing credit to firms and individuals who face reductions in
pre-tax income and even more (due to the higher taxes) in after-tax income and
saving.
So a downward
spiral develops: less income, less
consumption, more taxes, less saving, less bank credit, less production. Higher tax rates
notwithstanding, the public debt / GDP ratio does not meaningfully improve due
to the GDP contraction.
Tax Credit Certificates (“TCC”)
Troubled European
countries currently face depressed, ie much lower than their potential,
demand and production, which implies elevated unemployment. Traditional economic policy tools are currently
ineffective.
Expansionary fiscal policies cannot be pursued: financing higher public expenditure or lower taxes is
too expensive or impossibile. Indeed, contractionary fiscal policies were introduced
instead, to avoid interest costs spiraling out of control.
Expansionary
monetary policies are impossibile too: depressed economies can
expand money circulation with no meaningful impact on prices. But the euro is
the currency not just of the depressed Mediterranean area but of the Northern
European countries, where the employment picture is much brighter, as well. The
required monetary expansion will push inflation to unacceptable levels in
Northern Europe.
TCC (Tax Credit Certificates) would overcome the
limitation of the traditional economic policy tools in the current environment.
TCC basic features
would be:
They would be
assigned to residents of specific, economically troubled countries.
Starting from a
future date (eg two years from their issuance) they will enjoy unlimited
acceptance to pay taxes or whatever liability or expense due to the issuing
government.
They will be freely
tradeable to make possible to the owner to convert them in euros, even before
the usability date.
A market discount
rate (eg 10% upon the issuance date = 5% per each year between the issuance and
the usability date) will apply, declining to zero as the usability date will
approach.
TCC to reduce the
“tax wedge” and the cost of labor
TCC will be primarily issued to employers and to
employees, to partially offset tax and social costs (ie contributions to the national
pension and health systems).
This reduces the difference between the total cost of
labor and employees net income (the “tax wedge”) and
allows to significantly reduce the main cause of the
eurocrisis, the competitivity and productivity gap between Northern and
Mediterranean Europe.
As far as Italy is concerned, the most relevant data
may summarize as follows (based on 2012 forecast):
Total labor costs: € 985 bln, of which private sector
€ 818 bln and public sector € 167 bln.
Social costs paid by private sector employees: € 60
bln.
Social costs paid by private sector employers: € 120 bln.
Social costs paid by public sector employees: € 12 bln.
Social costs paid by public sector employers: € 26 bln.
TCC will be issued equal to 70% of social costs paid
by employees (both private and public sector) and to 70% of social costs paid
by private sector employers. No issue will be made to the public employer (ie the
State) as it would be a self-offsetting accounting entry.
Both employees and employers will pay the same amount
of social costs IN EURO as today (so no cash deficit will be created to the
government). BUT they will partially offset it due to the TCC they will receive.
TCC to reduce the “tax wedge”
and the cost of labor: results
Total TCC issued will be € 134 bln, of which:
To private sector employees: € 42 bln ( = 70% of 60 ).
To private sector employers: € 84 bln ( = 70% of 120
).
To public sector employees: € 8 bln ( = 70% of 12 ).
Most of TCC, ie € 126 bln, will be issued to private
sector employees and employers.
This is a key data. As total labor costs in the private
sector are € 818 bln, annual CCF of € 126 bln imply a 15-16% labor cost
reduction, if employees net income stays the same.
This strongly reduces the difference of labor
cost per unit of output between Italy and Germany (approximately 20%).
TCC then are an appropriate tool to manage the
ultimate cause of the eurocrisis: differences in labor cost per unit of output
between countries, which exchange rate fluctuations are not available to offset
anymore.
Public sector labor costs were not taken into account
as public services (public health, public schooling, police, national defence
etc.) basically are neither exported nor compete with imports. Then they do not
affect the trade unbalances, which are a key element of the eurocrisis.
TCC’S
IMPACT ON LABOR COST AND LABOR INCOME FOR A SAMPLE EMPLOYEE
|
TCC to the
|
TCC to the
|
Improvement
|
||||
Pre-tax
annual wage (a)
|
50,000
|
employee
|
employer
|
in %
|
|||
Social
costs payable by the employee (b)
|
-4,000
|
2,800
|
|||||
Personal income taxes (c)
|
-14,000
|
||||||
Net
income ( a less b less c )
|
32,000
|
2,800
|
8.8%
|
||||
Social
costs payable by the employer (d)
|
8,000
|
5,600
|
|||||
Severance provision (e)
|
3,500
|
||||||
Total
cost for the employer ( a plus d plus e )
|
61,500
|
5,600
|
9.1%
|
||||
TCC to stimulate
demand and supplement incomes
TCC could also be a
tool to supplement income for needy citizens.
Eg € 21 bln worth
of TCC can be issued to the less affluent half of the Italian population (30 million
people), ie € 700 each (€ 2,800 for a four-persons family).
This could take
place for the timeframe necessary to bring the Italian economy back to normal
conditions – say two years.
TCC might also be
issued to pay for government expenditure. Mix and size of TCC uses will clearly
be a matter of political decisions.
Current economic scenario
Currently (2012) Italy’s
GDP is approximately 10% lower than its potential level – ie the level which
implies adequate employment and capacity utilization:
The 2009 world
financial crisis caused a 5% fall.
Austerity is
producing a 2.5% decline in 2012.
From 1999 onwards
Italian growth was generally subpar.
Austerity policies aim
at stabilizing the public debt at the current € 2,000 bln level (126% of 2012
GDP). This result is far from being
assured.
Meanwhile, restrictive tax and spending policies are
expected to prevent the Italian economy to recover its potential any time soon.
The
most recent (September 20, 2012) update released by the government forecast no
growth in 2013 and minimal growth (marginally above 1%) in 2014 and 2015.
Public debt as a
percentage of GDP would decline from 126% to 120%.
This implies no
meaningful improvement in the employment scenario. And the euro area status would
keep being precarious.
Troubles affect the
whole of Southern Europe, not just Italy, which is already causing the whole
world economy to slow down significantly. Further deterioration could easily
occur, which would aggravate tensions in the financial markets and rule out
even the modest improvement which austerity is expected to bring to public
finances.
Benefits from TCC
TCC would be a big
game changer. The proposed yearly issue is € 155 bln, ie 10% of th Italian GDP,
and implies higher incomes, higher individuals’ purchasing power and lower
corporate labor costs.
GDP is likely to
increase by a similar order of magnitude. Under the conservative forecast that
the full benefit will take three years to be achieved, by 2015 year-end the
public debt / GDP ratio will decline to 106% instead of 120%.
While relevant per
se, this is much more meaningful as it is achieved in a growing, not in a
stagnating economy.
Further, TCC could be introduced not just in Italy but
in all the Euro area troubled economies. This (see later) makes the
euro project sustainable which implies further benefits:
Stabilization of
world financial markets.
Stronger world
economic growth.
Higher stock exchange prices.
Lower interest
rates spreads within the euro area.
Further public debt
reduction achievable by divesting assets at higher prices.
ITALY – MACROECONOMIC FORECAST (€ bln)
|
|||||||
WITHOUT TCC
|
2012
|
2013
|
2014
|
2015
|
|||
Gross Domestic Product
|
1,564
|
1,583
|
1,631
|
1,683
|
|||
GDP real growth
|
-0.2%
|
1.1%
|
1.3%
|
||||
Price effect on GDP growth
|
1.4%
|
1.9%
|
1.9%
|
||||
Public debt
|
1,977
|
1,996
|
2,007
|
2,018
|
|||
Public debt / GDP
|
126%
|
126%
|
123%
|
120%
|
|||
Source: Italian Government -
September 20, 2012
|
|||||||
WITH TCC
|
2012
|
2013
|
2014
|
2015
|
|||
Gross Domestic Product
|
1,564
|
1,635
|
1,740
|
1,854
|
|||
Higher GDP growth (*)
|
3.3%
|
3.3%
|
3.3%
|
||||
GDP real growth
|
3.1%
|
4.4%
|
4.6%
|
||||
Price effect on GDP growth
|
1.4%
|
1.9%
|
1.9%
|
||||
GDP increase vs the W/O TCC scenario
|
52
|
109
|
171
|
||||
Tax revenues / GDP
|
49.5%
|
49.0%
|
48.8%
|
||||
Additional tax revenues
|
26
|
53
|
83
|
||||
TCC issued
|
155
|
155
|
134
|
||||
TCC redeemed to pay taxes and other liabilities due to the State
|
155
|
||||||
Public debt
|
1,977
|
1,951
|
1,897
|
1,969
|
|||
Public debt / GDP
|
126%
|
119%
|
109%
|
106%
|
|||
TCC outstanding at year-end (not included in the public debt)
|
155
|
310
|
289
|
||||
(*) Higher growth equal to the ratio of TCC issued annually to 2012 GDP; achieved
between 2013 and 2015.
|
TCC to be
introduced in other euro area countries
In addition to
Italy, each troubled euro country could and should issue its own TCC, in a
personalized fashion.
A meaningful part
of each country’s TCC should, as in Italy, be used to reduce the difference
between labor costs to the employers and net incomes to the employees (the tax
wedge).
But Spain, for
instance, could elect to issue TCC also to strengthen troubled banks’ equity,
thus reducing the recourse to external aids.
If introduced in
several countries, TCC would be even more effective and would actually
be a permanent solution to the euro area unbalances.
TTC actually vindicate austerity
Austerity aims at
reducing public deficits and improving ability to refinance the debt.
BUT higher taxes
and lower government expenditure cause demand, production and incomes to fall.
Austerity reduces
the public deficit if GDP stays the same, but this is not the case. Benefit
on public finances from austerity are largely offset by the fall in GDP – and
the economy suffers meanwhile.
If TCC are
introduced instead, austerity can raise government euro revenues, while
avoiding depressionary effects on the economy.
The government
takes euro but gives to the citizens something in exchange – TCC.
TCC will be
available eg two years from their issues to pay taxes or whatever liability is
due to the state.
An interim period
before utilization is needed to make TCC redeemable when the economic recovery
will be well underway – thus creating higher tax revenues, which will
compensate the redemption of TCC.
The strategy works
because the economy potential GDP is much higher than the current depressed
level. TCC will support demand and reduce production costs, which will bring
GDP much closer to its potential. This will break the negative loop of fiscal
contraction -> income contraction -> no public finances healing.
TCC makes the euro
system flexible and sustainable
TCC can be
introduced in different countries and can have different size and features.
This is key to make
the euro system flexible, which is a precondition for it to be permanent.
Troubled euro area
countries currently lack the ability to adopt expansionary monetary policies
(devaluating, lowering rates, supporting credit) as they do not print their own
currency.
Fiscal policies
meanwhile have to be restrictive, as troubled countries have problems in
refinancing the existing debt.
TCC are a tool
which gives back to each country the ability to pursue expansionary economic
policies.
In addition, TCC can
– and should – be utilized primarily to reduce labor costs without depressing
employees income.
The eurocrisis was
generated by Northern and Southern European countries having different labor
costs dynamics. This created trade unbalances and deteriorated the ability of
less efficient countries to refinance their indebtedness.
TCC are the
appropriate tool to adjust costs and productivity between countries, which in the
pre-euro era was achieved through currencies realignments.
Why TCC are not
debt
Are TCC a government
liability, to be included in the public debt ?
When they will be
redeemed to pay eg taxes (two years after their issuance, according to the
proposal) all other things being equal government revenues will be lower.
But this is
expected to be compensated by the expansionary effect produced by TCC on the
economy.
Were it not the
case, actions on the public deficit will be required. However, this does not
make TCC a form of debt. Under this respect they are more similar to hidden
public pensions liabilities. If current laws imply a deterioration in the
pensions / contribution ratio, either the public pension scheme would have to
receive more funding, or the laws will have to be modified. However, hidden
pension liabilities are not included in the public debt; rather, they are an
element to be taken into account in forecasting future requirements.
Why TCC,
appropriately used, do not create inflation
TCC are more
similar to national currency than to public debt. They will be issued on a
country basis and will be redeemable against liabilities where the issuing
government is the creditor.
Having said that,
there is no reason (neither theoretical nor practical) to issue TCC notes and
coins. Only one circulating currency will
exist – the euro.
TCC could create
inflation in case they are issued in excess of the level appropriate to bring
economic activity back to its potential. Currently, however, troubled euro
countries are very far from this.
TCC are the
appropriate tool to overcome the eurocrisis as each country can issue their
own TCC, and tailor them according to its needs: this solves the big
weakness of the euro – a single monetary policy in a plurality of
countries with different economic conditions.
TCC make it
possible to pursue expansionary policies in countries where they are required,
while avoiding unacceptable inflation elsewhere.
THE AUTHOR – SHORT CV
Marco Cattaneo, b. 1962, Magenta (Italy).
Degree in business administration, magna cum laude
(Bocconi 1985).
Between 1985 and 1994
held a variety of financial planning, reporting and corporate finance positions
with the Montedison Group, then one the largest Italian industrial concerns.
Since 1995 he was
active in managing private equity funds. As CEO of LBO Italia (1995-2007) and
chairman of CPI Private Equity (2008 onwards) he completed eleven buy-outs of
small-medium sized Italian entrepreneurial companies and oversaw their
development.
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