The Italian
economy suffers from a huge lack of domestic demand and purchasing power, as
well as from competitiveness issues.
Injecting
purchasing power in the economy and reducing taxes are therefore preconditions
to solve the crisis.
Doing this by
increasing public debt is restricted by the Eurozone governance framework. In
addition, it would not be desirable anyway, primarily because increasing the
debt to be reimbursed in a currency that Italy cannot issue (the euro) carries
a default risk.
This is why we
devised Fiscal Money.
Fiscal Money
would not increase the Maastricht Debt, which only includes financial
liabilities to be redeemed in cash.
We verified this
debt-related issue extensively from both a legal and an accounting standpoint.
But it is also important to add that the reason for not including non-payable
tax liabilities (i.e., Fiscal Money) in the Maastricht Debt is a matter of
substance, not just of form.
The reason is
that a non-payable liability does not bear any default risk due to the lack of
repayment capacity from the issuer of the liability.
Italy could thus
stop, once and for all, increasing its Maastricht Debt, and could inject Fiscal
Money into the economy just up to the level required to restore full
employment.
The value of Fiscal
Money would be guaranteed by the Italian government’s committment to accepting
it in exchange for rebates on tax obligations. As long as the Fiscal Money made
available to the taxpayers were just a fraction of total gross tax receipts, the
guarantee would be very solid (even in the event of a severe economic slowdown).
This is in fact
what we envision, since our base case projections posit Fiscal Money issues to
peak at approximately € 100 billion per year, which compares to € 800 billion total
governmental receipts.
In any case, even
the overissuance of Fiscal Money would only depreciate its value vis-a-vis the
euro – but would in no way create any additional default risk on Italy’s
Maastricht Debt obligations.
The Fiscal Money
program would therefore (1) be totally consistent with the Eurozone governance
framework, (2) revamp Italy’s domestic demand and competitiveness in Italy, and
(3) not require any financial transfer or additional guarantee from either the
ECB or the Eurozone partners.
To the best of
our knowledge and understanding, the program is by far the smoothest and most
effective way to restore prosperity and financial stability in Italy and the whole
Eurozone.
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